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I HE RATE OF INFLATION has accelerated
since 1965, until in the past year overall prices have
risen more than 5 per cent, Progress in reducing in-
flation has been very siow, both because the inflation
was permitted to develop momentum from 1964
through 1968, and because a gradual approach has
been applied in correcting it in 1969 and 1970.
Growth in total spending has been slowed to about
the estimated growth in productive capacity since
the third quarter of 1969. Production and employ-
ment have been affected adversely, but the adjust-
ment has been much less than in previous periods of
economic correction. Construction has been cut back,
and bond and stock prices have fallen.’
This article reviews the recent growth trend of the
money stock. To evaluate this trend and possible
future trends, the article examines some evidence
bearing on the current growth rate in the amount of
money demanded. It also examines some credit and
regulatory developments that might affect the Fed-
eral Reserve System’s control of the money stock in
the near future.
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Two cnjcial questions for current stabilization pol-
icy are: (1) What rate of growth of total spending is
most desirable to keep downward pressure on infla-
tion and expectations of inflation? (2) What rate of
monetary expansion is consistent with such a growth
of total spending?
Studies conducted by this bank indicate that a
moderate 6 to 7 per cent rate of growth of total
spending would gradually reduce the rate of increase
in overall prices from 5.3 per cent a year in the first
half of 1970 to about 3.5 per cent a year in the first
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An article in this Review last month (“Inflation and Its
Cure,” pp. 2-7) concluded that many of these costs probably
resulted from the public adapting to the higher rates of
anticipated inflation, and the downward pressure on prices
remained light.
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half of 1972.2 According to these estimation , total
real output v. ould rise about 1 per cent in the next
twelve months and nearly 4 per cent in the following
year.
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Total spending for goods and services may accel-
erate or decelerate as a result of any one of a number
of disturbances. One such disturbance is a change in
the money stock initiated by the monetary authorities
relative to the amonnt of money demanded by the
public. Important factors affecting amount of money
demanded are spending, income, wealth, prices of
goods and services, and interest rates. The amount
of money demanded is little affected in the short run
by those factors which determine the supply.
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Calculated using the model discussed in “A Monetarist
Model for Economic Stabilization,” Leonall C. Andersen
and Keith M. Carlson, April 1970 issue of this Review, pp.
7-25. For current simulations, see the “Quarterly Economic
Trends” release of this Bank.
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If the money stock is greater (or less) than the
equilibrium amount demanded at prevailing eco-
nomic conditions, the resulting discrepancy tends to
cause the rate of spending on goods, services, and
financial assets to increase (or decrease). The process
will continue until, with new levels of spending, in-
come, prices, wealth, and interest rates, the amount
of money demanded equals the amount supplied.
The equilibrium amount of money demanded at a
point in time can only be measured indirectly. Some
evidence can be obtained on whether it is greater or
smaller than the amount supplied by observing
whether the general trend of spending is accelerating
or decelerating. When the rate of growth of spend-
ing remains unchanged for a prolonged period, the
amount of money demanded is evidently rising at
about the same rate as the money stock.
Some insight into the rate of monetary growth
which would be most conducive to a moderate growth
of total spending may be obtained from past experi-
ence. From the 1957 high in business activity to the
high in 1965, when the money stock grew at an aver-
age 2.2 per cent a year, the trend growth in total
spending was 5.7 per cent a year
Since economic conditions were similar in 1957
and 1965, the amount of money demanded also rose
at roughly a 2.2 per cent trend rate from 1.957 to
1965. Flowever, the amount of money demanded is
probably rising at a faster rate now, requiring a more
rapid injection of money to avoid having a depress-
ing effect on total spending. Prices arc now rising
more rapidly than from 1957 to 1965 and are ex-
pected to continue to rise for some time, requiring
more money for transactions. Interest rates generally
rose in the earlier period, increasing the alternative
cost of holding nonearning cash balances. If interest
rates now stabilize or decline, as seems likely, this
incentive to reduce cash holdings will no longer exist,
Also, many may feel that their overall liquidity has
been reduced beyond desired levels> especially in
view of recent declines in security prices, insolvency
of some corporations, and talk of a money squeeze.
To the extent that attempts are made to conserve
and build up cash balances, growth in spending
slows unless offset by a more rapid growth in money
stock.
Relationships between estimated growth rates of
money stock and total spending, formulated using
this Bank’s model, suggest that the amount of money
demanded now may be rising about 6 per cent a
year. To reduce inflation and inflationary expecta-
tions, however, it is necessary for the stock of money
to grow less rapidly than the amount demanded in
order to restrain growth in total spending. Calcula-
tions at this Bank indicate that a fairly steady 5 per
cent growth rate of money would be most likely to
succeed in the current situation in fostering a mod-
erate 6 per cent rate of growth in total spending in
the next twelve months.
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During the spring of 1970 there was a sizable in-
jection of money, and from the first to the second
quarter, the money stock rose at a rapid 6 per cent
annual rate, Moreover, it is likely that in the remain-
der of the year the Treasury will be a large net bor-
rower of funds, both to meet seasonal needs and to
finance an expected deficit resulting from a reduced
rate of tax collections as growth of incomes slows.
When the Treasury borrows heavily, growth in money
stock frequently is expanded rapidly by the Federal
Reserve to accomodate market demands and amelio-
rate the higher interest rates that might otherwise re-
sult temporarily if funds have to be diverted from
other uses.
Since early May, however, growth in money has
been moderated, The slowing has occurred despite
some money market developments \vhich might have
caused the System to continue to expand money
rapidly. In late Apnl, terms of a Treasury security
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offering became unattractive in light of the sudden
Cambodian invasion. To obtain sufficient buyers, the
Federal Reserve expanded the money stock by in-
jecting member bank reserves. The money and capi-
tal markets became unsettled as a result of a marked
decline in stock and bond prices, the uncertain finan-
cial condition of some security dealers, the social un-
rest accompanying the Cambodian affair, talk of
liquidity squeeze, and the insolvency of some firms,
particularly the large Penn-Central Transportation
Company. In addition, the Treasury borrowed about
$7 billion of new funds in July and August.
Despite the slower growth in money and unsettled
money market conditions, interest rates generally de-
clined after early May. Three-month Treasury bill
rates, which reached 8 per cent early this year and
averaged 6.83 per cent in May, continued to decline
and averaged about 6.50 per cent in early August.
Rates on Federal funds declined from an 8,5 to 9 per
cent range in the June 1969 to February 1970 period
to an average 8 per cent from March to early June,
and to about 7 per cent during early August.
How was it possible for short-term interest rates to
decline in view of a slower growth in money after
early May? The demand for bank credit in the pri-
vate sector moderated. Since the period is still short,
the relaxation may prove to be merely a respite. But
recent economic developments are similar to those
during other postwar periods when we witnessed a
general decline of demands for credit and of interest
rates. With demands for credit less vigorous, interest
rates drifted lower. Limiting growth of money, in
turn, becomes easier when money market conditions
are not strained.
A brief review of selected key developments in-
dicates how credit demands may be relaxing. During
1967 and 1968 the money stock, increasing at a 7 per
cent annual rate, grew more rapidly than the amount
demanded by the public. As a result, total spending
on goods and services and credit demands were con-
tinuously and excessively stimulated. Subsequently,
the more moderate 3 per cent average rate of expan-
sion in money since early 1969 has probably been less
than growth in the amount demanded, which had
been accelerating with the higher actual and ex-
pected prices.
For a time after the growth of money moderated,
the stock of money held probably continued to ex-
ceed the overall amount demanded, and spending
continued to be stimulated. Some individuals and
businesses began to feel that their money balances
were relatively low as early as the summer of 1969
and began taking actions to conserve cash, but most
of the public probably continued to consider their
cash balances adequate. If their balances were less
than desired, the difference was small, as evidenced
by the mildness of the correction in spending growth
in late 1969.
With the amount of money demanded continuing
to rise faster than the quantity supplied (except
possibly for a brief period this spring), a growing
portion of the public began taking actions to conserve
and build cash balances. Individuals and businesses
may undertake to improve their cash positions in many
ways. Although there is reluctance to change con-
sumption patterns or business plans, some less essen-
tial projects are trimmed or postponed in an effort to
bolster cash balances. as evidenced by the moderated
growth in total spending. Some individuals may have
bought fewer stocks and bonds, or even liquidated
some securities, in an attempt to correct a cash short-
age. Although these efforts build cash holdings for
some economic units, others find their cash balances
declining since the total stock of money is little af-
fected by these adjustments. At the same time, the
resulting slower business conditions, and sharp de-
clines in security prices, as well as the talk of a
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money squeeze and the widespread publicity regard-
ing financial problems of particular firms, may have
caused some to revise upward the amount of money
they desired to hold.
Since the early Fifties, rates of gro\vth in the
amount of money supplied have fluctuated over a
much narrower range, and the stock of money has
more nearly approximated the amount demanded.
When amounts of money demanded exceeded the
amount supplied, some financial strains occurred for
a brief time, such as during the “credit crunch” in the
early fall of 1966. The adjustments, however, were
relatively mild, Rather than a widespread desperate
bidding for funds in the market, driving up short-term
interest rates, actions were taken to conserve cash
balances, such as trimming or postponing expansion
plans, policing inventories, reducing expenditures,
and shortening and upgrading investment holdings.
As a result, credit demands and interest rates, par-
ticularly those on short-term instruments, began de-
clining during these postwar periods of financialstress.
Conditions during the spring and early summer of
1970 appear to be similar to other recent periods
when, with the advantage of hindsight, it can be
concluded that the amount of money demanded ex-
ceeded the amount supplied. If so, investment plans
may have become less ebullient, and the demand for
credit may have passed its peak of intensity.
Control of Money Growth
If the demand for credit continues to be less in-
tense in the future than it was last winter, interest
rates may stabilize or decline somewhat further even
though the rate of growth of money stock is restrained.
Under such conditions it is much easier for the mone-
tary authorities to limit growth of bank reserves and
money than when interest rates are rising rapidly
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Very restrictive monetary actions might eliminate
inflation quickly, but at the expense of sharp cutbacks
in production and employment. With very expansive
monetary actions, inflation could not be eliminated —
it would accelerate,
According to calculations of this bank, a steady
moderate growth of money would reduce inflationary
pressures while holding the costs in terms of produc-
tion slack to reasonable levels. With a 5 per cent
annual rate of growth of money, it is estimated that
When the growth rates of the money stock were
permitted to vary much more than in recent dec-
ades, so-called money panics occurred. The amount
of money demanded at times greatly exceeded the
amount supplied, and short-term interest rates rose
sharply as the public scrambled for the limited funds.
In such periods, severe interruptions in economic
activity occurred. For example, in the spring of 1920,
money, which had been expanding at a 17 per cent
annual rate, suddenly began contracting at an 8 per
cent rate. Yields on prime 4- to 6-month commercial
paper jumped about 60 per cent within a few months,
and industrial production dropped about one-third
from early 1920 to early 1921.
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and market pressures are increasing. While modera-
tion of growth of the money stock may in the short
run keep interest rates somewhat higher than they
othenvise would be, this is a necessary step to lower
interest rates in the future.
Another recent development has contributed to
keeping monetary growth moderate. In January the
Regulation Q interest rate ceilings on time deposits
were raised slightly. Effective June 24, the ceiling
rate was completely suspended on large CD’s matur-
ing in 30 to 89 days, permitting banks to offer yields
competitive with other instruments. In the fifteen
months before ceilings were relaxed in January, time
deposits decreased at a 3 per cent annual rate. From
January to June, time deposits increased at a 12 per
cent nte, and weekly data smce late June mdicate
another marked acceleration.
This remterrnediation thiough banks of funds which
had been flowing through commercial paper or other
credit channels has little overall effect on total spend
ing or total credit outstanding. However, since CD’s
and other tune deposits must be supported by re
serves, banks have, fewer reserves available to sup-
port demand deposits (money). The additional re-
serves to support time deposits can be provided by
the Federal Reserve. However, there has been less
money market pressure to provide them with banks
expanding their credit at a faster rate, since a given
amount of reserves permits more bank loans and in-
vestments when liabilities are in the form of time
deposits than in demand deposits.
Conches
Inflation continues as a serious domestic economic
issue, deriving from the excessive total spending from
1965 through 1968. Since early 1969 monetary actions
have been directed toward dampening total spend-
ing and inflation, while holding the social and eco-
nomic costs of adjusting to lower price expectations
to tolerable levels.FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST, 1970
the rate of overall price increase would slow gradu-
ally from the 5.3 per cent average rate in the first
half of 1970 to about a 3.5 per cent rate in the spring
of 1972. Real product would expand as price rises
moderate, increasing from the recent little net change
to nearly 4 per cent in the hvelve months ending in
mid-1972,
Money has on the whole risen moderately since
last December, namely, at an average 4.1 per cent
annual rate, despite a rapid injection this spring.
Rapid increases in the money stock may be easier to
resist in the near future than from 1965 through 1968.
In contrast to the earlier period, private demands
for credit seem to be moderating. Also, the relaxation
of Regulation Q has permitted a faster growth of
time deposits and bank credit and more comfortable
hank reserve positions, even though total reserves
and money have expanded at a moderate rate.
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